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# Venture

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## Comment

### PRINCIPLES IN KENYA

ON August 21 the Governor of Kenya returned from the Coast to Nairobi to plan a Mau Mau surrender campaign. Terrorists, it was reported, were now being driven back on a scale sufficient to enable the Kenya Government to convince them that Mau Mau was doomed. Since then, some surrenders have taken place, but there have also been attacks on schools and individuals and thefts of cattle, while it has been officially disclosed that a new African movement under the name 'Utsi' has become active near Mombasa, and that 50 members were imprisoned during one week although there had been no violence and no connection with Mau Mau is suspected. In this rather uncertain atmosphere, the European Elected Members of Legislative Council have enunciated nine principles of policy which are presumably intended to be clarion call to Kenya. We print these on page 8. Where they are not platitudinous (1-6) they are clearly directed against United Kingdom control (7-8), with a view to establishing a common European-dominated system from Uganda to the borders of the Union (9). Worse still, Mr. Michael Blundell, who has been commonly regarded as one of the most progressive European politicians in Kenya, explained them on August 26 to a delegate conference of the [European] Electors' Union. He made it clear, for example, that the Highlands of Kenya should be a European area in which 'the terms and conditions of entry and employment' would rest with 'the people who have security in the Highlands'—presumably, from the context, with Europeans. Leaving aside the racial implications of this statement, it is incredible that such an attitude towards

labour conditions and labour relations can be publicly stated in 1953 by an employer in British territory. But the racial issue was clearly uppermost in the minds of the conference, which passed a resolution calling for the encouragement of immigration of at least 30,000 Europeans within the next five years, and a ban on further Asian immigration except for key men. It is difficult to believe that anybody outside the conference could consider these resolutions likely to promote the 'racial harmony and friendliness' referred to in Point 6 of the programme. The reference to federation can be regarded only as deliberate provocation, since the African Members of Legislative Council had in the previous month publicly stated their opposition to Federation with the other East and Central African territories, and the Secretary of State had made it plain that no practical steps were being taken towards it.

If the Kenya Government wishes to lead African opinion, it will have to offer something very different from this unofficial European programme. At present, it is making a number of small improvements. Loans are to be granted to African traders as well as to African farmers; taxes on African co-operatives have been waived for five years; large grants are being made for housing in the towns (though it is pathetic that in Nairobi the programme is described in terms of 'bed spaces' rather than houses); an inter-racial primary school—for which there should be a special welcome—is being opened this month. But meanwhile no political future is held out to the Africans. The Government has made it plain that no Colony-wide African political organisation will be allowed, though it is armed with a Registration of Societies Ordinance which should give protection against subversion. Government spokesmen even talk as though it is *their* job to build up African political organisations, and sometimes Mr. Blundell speaks as though it is his. There was some excuse for



such attitudes in the immediate shock of the first Mau-Mau outrages. By now, the whole world knows that there are many brave Africans as much opposed to Mau Mau as people of other races. Has the Government of Kenya any political future for them?

## WHAT IS PARTNERSHIP?

THE report that the Central African Confederate Party has accepted the principle of 'partnership' interpreted as 'a partnership between races and not between individual members of races,'<sup>1</sup> sends us back to a time-honoured question which has not yet been clearly answered. Since the war, separate African representation has been built up in the legislatures of British territories from Uganda to the Southern Rhodesian border. It was essential that this should be done—otherwise no African voice would have been heard on the many issues that affect these territories. But in doing it, the British Government ran the risk of establishing separate African representation which would always remain separate and, in the circumstances, subordinate. Southern Rhodesia has followed instead a common roll policy, operated in such a way that no African voice is heard in Parliament at all. Both of these extremes must be avoided. A third method, now to be adopted in Tanganyika and demanded by African leaders in Northern Rhodesia, is separate representation plus parity. This is an improvement, since it ensures that African representation is sufficient to carry equal weight with that of other communities. It confers an appearance of equality of status that is genuine, up to a point, and soothing beyond that point. Is this, perhaps, the 'partnership' that is so often mentioned but never defined? If it is, it is time the British Government stated its ultimate purpose. For our part, we stick to the interpretation outlined in *Advance to Democracy*<sup>2</sup>:—

'We cannot . . . admit a conception of "equal" communities in which a few thousand Europeans wield permanently a power vastly in excess of their numbers. In a democratic society, equality would mean equality between individuals, not between racial groups, however large or small.'

We are in full agreement with the statement made in the House of Commons by Mr. James Griffiths<sup>3</sup> that:—

<sup>1</sup> *The Times*, September 12, 1953.

<sup>2</sup> Fabian Colonial Bureau, June, 1952, 6d.

<sup>3</sup> Debate on Central African Federation, *Hansard*, June 6, 1953.

' . . . we have had no affirmation that there is only one inevitable and desirable end to a partnership, namely, ultimately to lead to full democracy. If we could have that assurance many of the fears would be removed.'

That assurance was never given in the course of the debate. It has not been given yet, either in Central Africa or here. In view of what is being said in Central Africa, it is time the British Government gave it. Otherwise, the Secretary of State may yet have to make the speech so brilliantly prepared for him by Mr. J. Huizinga in his pamphlet, *Mr. Lyttelton's Swansong*. The trouble is that it might also be the swansong of all European influence, enlightened as well as retrograde, in Central Africa.

## INFORMING UNO

IT would be most ill advised if the British Government were to follow the Belgian in deciding to withdraw from the United Nations committee which examines information on non-self-governing territories submitted by the metropolitan powers. Such an action would certainly be interpreted as conclusive proof that Britain has something to hide. It would not improve international relations, nor would it add to British prestige. But it is not too early, in view of the impending revision of the United Nations Charter, to consider whether anything can be done to improve the working of the various United Nations bodies which concern themselves with colonial affairs. In our correspondence columns this month Mr. C. W. W. Greenidge suggests that the committee should consist of experts who have some special knowledge of colonial conditions and a contribution to make to the discussion of colonial problems. This suggestion is worthy of serious consideration. It would ensure that those participating would be able to interpret the material that is placed in front of them. It would not prevent attacks on the metropolitan powers, but there is no case for objecting to informed, constructive criticism. The objection is to criticism with the object of embarrassing a power to which the critic is opposed for reasons unconnected with the merits of the case or the interests of the colonial peoples. When this happens, the Colonies become a mere pawn in the cold war. An extreme example was afforded last year in the Trusteeship Council, when the Soviet delegate's proposals on the annual report of the Cameroons under United Kingdom trusteeship were identical with the Soviet proposals the previous year.<sup>1</sup> The British representative expressed

<sup>1</sup> *U.N. Trusteeship Council Official Records*, Eleventh Session, 446th and 448th meeting.



surprise that they were also identical with those submitted on Ruanda Urundi under Belgian trusteeship (with one small addition), on the Pacific territories under United States trusteeship and on New Guinea under Australian trusteeship. This kind of approach will not be altered by expert knowledge, but only by a desire to make the United Nations system benefit the Colonies and trust territories. The Soviet Union may change this approach—it has, for example, made its first offer to subscribe to the United Nations technical assistance funds. If it now decides to instruct its delegates to talk sense rather than propagandist nonsense, presumably its satellites will do the same. It would be a tragedy if the metropolitan powers decided at the same moment to withdraw from discussion altogether.

## OIL AND THE WELFARE STATE

WHEN Mr. John Rankin asked in the House of Commons on February 25 why the Government of Brunei had been budgeting for the expenditure of roughly one-tenth of its revenue, he revealed the startling disparity between a backward territory with inadequate social services and the enormous revenue it was deriving from oil. Now comes the announcement of a five-year development plan for the expenditure of \$100m. (over £11½m.) on a population of under 50,000. If the Plan is successful, Brunei will become the first welfare state in the East. Old age, widows' and orphans' pensions are promised, together with disability allowances. Existing schools, in which at present just under half the state's children are receiving education, are to be improved, 30 new schools are planned, and there are to be free school meals and a comprehensive scholarship scheme. Medical improvements will include a new hospital, travelling dispensaries, and ante-natal and post-natal clinics which will provide free milk. The economic base of the territory is to be strengthened by additional communications, agricultural settlement, and development in the rubber industry. There is no explanation, however, of the means by which Brunei hopes to secure labour and staff, the shortage of which has up to now accounted for its inability to spend its money.

The wealth of Brunei and these plans for the future also raise the question of the neighbouring territories of North Borneo and Sarawak. The concept of a South-East Asian Dominion may still appear to be far from realisation, but a start on a smaller scale was made in April when a Co-ordinating Committee consisting of the Governors of Sarawak and North Borneo and the Sultan of

Brunei, and three other representatives from each territory, met in Kuching. It decided to create a standing conference of the heads of the three states to meet twice a year under the chairmanship of the Commissioner-General for South-east Asia. Periodic joint meetings are to take place between heads of departments. The territories have similar problems, but Brunei has all the oil while Sarawak and North Borneo depend for revenue primarily on rubber export duties. Here is one area in the Commonwealth where the economic advantages of federation are obvious. Whether there is likely to be a political foundation for such a development in the near future is less certain. Brunei is a Sultanate with a British Resident and has so far only reached the stage of proposing the dilution of the Sultan's traditional Council with members to be chosen from District Councils. There are still official majorities on the Sarawak and North Borneo Councils. But all three territories are proceeding with local government changes and all three are making progress on the social front. They have not done badly since the Japanese occupation. It is to be hoped that Brunei at least will now be able to get the men and materials to enable it to use its oil windfalls to good purpose.

## TRADE UNIONS AND MRA

THE recent concentration of the Moral Rearmament movement on colonial leaders, including trade union leaders, gives point to a tentative report on the movement by the Executive Board of the International Confederation of Free Trade Unions. The full text of the Report is given in the I.C.F.T.U.'s *Information Bulletin* dated September 15, 1953. The Executive Board makes it clear that the I.C.F.T.U. observes neutrality in party political and religious matters. It has turned its attention to MRA only because of its 'encroachment . . . on trade union fields and the sphere of labour legislation.' From their experience of this 'encroachment' in their own countries, trade union leaders from New Zealand, Canada, Denmark, Germany, the United States, France and Britain expressed opposition to it, the German commenting that 'years of trade union experience have shown that the technique of mass suggestion . . . cannot do away with social anomalies—on the contrary it may confuse them still further.' Because the I.C.F.T.U. has found evidence even of attempts to establish 'yellow' unions, it proposes to study the matter further. Its first conclusion is expressed with habitual bluntness: 'non-trade union organisations of whatever kind are not called upon to concern themselves with trade union affairs. This also applies to *Moral Rearmament*.'



# THE NIGERIAN DECISIONS—I

by Marjorie Nicholson

WHATEVER the purposes of the Nigerian Conference held in London in July and August, the result is a fundamental revision of the Macpherson Constitution. The Conference wandered far from the original crisis in the central Council of Ministers into a large number of the intricate by-ways of Nigerian politics, some of which might better have been left unvisited for the time being. Unfortunately, we are not given a verbatim report, so that neither we nor the long-suffering electorates of Nigeria can know exactly what has been done in our name, by whom and why. What we can do is analyse the information we have been given<sup>1</sup> and form our own conclusions on the method by which the decisions were reached.

The most important result is the virtual abandonment of the conception of a unitary Nigeria by all groups with the exception of the National Independence Party, which withdrew from the Conference at the twelfth session, adhering to its view that

'in the present circumstances of Nigeria, with its multiplicity and diversity of cultural and ethnic groups, it is necessary to have a strong and independent Central Government whose authority and prestige will give confidence and security to the minority groups within the federation and command international respect for Nigeria.'<sup>2</sup>

Instead, the Nigerian Central Government is to be slightly weaker, in relation to the Regions, than the federal Government in Central Africa, where there were special reasons, including Protectorate status, for securing as much autonomy as possible for two of the three constituent territories which had previously been separate states.

Lists of federal and concurrent subjects have been drawn up for Nigeria, with residual powers, as in Central Africa, in the hands of the Regional Governments. By contrast with Central Africa, taxation and higher education (except for existing institutions financed from central funds) do not appear on the federal list. In the light of such decisions, the original dispute over the date of Nigerian self-government takes on a different colour. The Conference decided 'that in 1956 Her Majesty's Government would grant to those Regions which desired it full self-government in respect of all matters within the competence of the Regional Governments, with the proviso that there should be safeguards to ensure that the Regional Governments did not act so as to impede or prejudice the exercise by the Federal Government of the functions assigned to it now, or as amended by agreement in the future, or in any way make the continuance of federation impossible.'

It is difficult to imagine what 'self-government' in the Regions would imply, beyond the withdrawal of such official influence as remains. It cannot include the possibility that

'if Lagos was separated from the Western Region the West would secede from Nigeria and the people of the Region would not be bound by any law passed by any Nigerian parliament.'<sup>3</sup>

But whatever interpretation is given in 1956, regional powers are to be increased now. The central legislature is to be completely separated from the regional legislatures, regional legislation will no longer have to be submitted to the central Council of Ministers, and each Region is to have its own civil service separate from the federal service. The centre thus loses co-ordinating powers which have not, in practice, worked well. The conference decided to dispense with them altogether rather than try to use them effectively. In addition, each Region may, subject to the constitution of one central board, set up its own marketing boards with their own powers to control price and stabilisation policies, provided that there is machinery for 'consultation' between regional boards handling the same commodity. Even the funds held by the four existing Nigerian boards are to be divided in proportion between the proposed new regional boards. The possibilities of economic or any other type of planning over the whole country are by these means reduced to a shadow. It even seems doubtful whether able politicians will in future be attracted to the centre, since their field of operation will be much reduced, and a great deal of what remains will be controlled by the Governor. Nigeria as a country may yet pay a very heavy price for the increased efficiency in regional government which the proposed changes are expected to bring about.

## The New Regionalism

When 'regionalism' was established under the Richards Constitution of 1947, the regional assemblies were advisory bodies. They became legislative bodies under the present Constitution, but with close (although ill-defined) links with the centre. The three Regions were given powers on the basis of substantial populations and wide areas. The opponents of 'regionalism,' at that time to be found in the National Council of Nigeria and the Cameroons, argued that the three Regions did not correspond to ethnic groups: they rejected the conception of a Yoruba West, an Ibo East and a Hausa North, and pointed out that within each Region there were minority groups, such as the Western Ibos in the Western Region, the Efiks and Ibibios in the East and the

<sup>1</sup> Report by the Conference on the Nigerian Constitution, August, 1953. Cmd. 8934, H.M. Stationery Office. 9d.

<sup>2</sup> Statement by Mr. A. C. Nwapa, Press Conference, London, August 8, 1953.

<sup>3</sup> Statement by Mr. O. Awolowo on return to Lagos, *The Times*, September 8, 1953.



'pagans' in the Muslim North. To the concept of three large Regions they opposed that of small linguistic states. But these states would have been held together by a strong centre. The possibility of small units with complete autonomy in a wide range of subjects was not advanced by anybody, and has not yet been publicly discussed.

Yet it is towards this idea that Nigeria is now tending. The one tangible result of the Conference which is likely to be accepted without serious opposition anywhere is the separation of the Southern Cameroons from the Eastern Region. The separation of Lagos from the Western Region is being bitterly opposed by the Action Group, but it was decided by the Secretary of State, whose decision had considerable backing from the other delegations. The size of the Northern Region, with the consequent strength of the North in the central legislature, has also raised discussion on regional boundaries. It is argued that some groups in the North, particularly in the 'Middle Belt,' will always be under-represented unless the present system of election is changed. The Action Group takes the view that 'the Northern Region . . . is too large to remain one Region' and has stated<sup>1</sup> that it did not press this at the Conference to avoid driving the Northern leaders to demand complete secession, but their forbearance on this point is accompanied by proposals for a uniform electoral system which the North has already rejected. If discussion on the size of Regions continues—and a number of people have a direct interest in continuing them—Nigeria may ultimately find itself with the worst of both worlds in small regions with a weak centre. If the representatives of all Regions had made a serious attempt to work the Constitution together, correcting its deficiencies in agreement with one another, and had then found that with the best will in the world they could find no correction short of reducing the Central Government to a negligible factor, it would be worth courting this danger. But the course of recent events suggests rather that party leaders have allowed themselves to be frozen into rigid attitudes which cannot now be relaxed, and that the risks of the present decisions have not been faced, much less explained to the electorate as part of a considered policy.

On the other aspects of the Constitution the Conference was more successful. By establishing a completely separate central legislature, the principal defect has been removed. Elections will be held direct to the House of Representatives, with no reference to the regional Houses of Assembly. If regional one-party blocs are sent to the centre, that will be the choice of the people: it will no longer be achieved by the dominance of party majorities in the regional Houses, acting with scant respect for the wishes of the electorate. In the West, Lagos will thus have a chance to send in its own candidates,<sup>2</sup> in the North

members are to be sent to the centre from each division, as they are at present from the East. This proposal is an advance on the existing position, although the retention of the electoral college system is a conservative victory which does nothing to help the parties like the Northern Elements Progressive Union who cannot break through the present traditional blockade of the North. Moreover, it encourages criticism of the Northern strength in the central legislature.

### The Central Government

If the proposed electoral system does not provide for democracy, at least it should give slightly more flexibility to the central legislature. But the changed composition of the Central Council of Ministers reflects the continuance of the hankering for regional control of the centre which precipitated the crisis. If a national party emerges and wins the elections, there will be no trouble, for the Ministry will be appointed 'on the recommendation of the leader' of that party. But if not, appointment will be

'on the recommendation of the leaders . . . of the majority party in the House from each Region.'

Unless the majority parties agree, there can be no united central Government—coalitions using the services of minority regional groups are ruled out. It seems a far cry yet from cabinet unity with full ministerial responsibility.

The drive in the Conference appears to have come not from an expression of unity already attained, but from the desire to eliminate official influence. The *ex-officio* members of the House of Representatives are logically reduced to three by the withdrawal of the regional Lieutenant-Governors, who are also excluded from the Central Council of Ministers. All officials are to be withdrawn from the Western and Eastern regional Houses and Government—a withdrawal which may be a doubtful benefit in the latter case if the Eastern elections are won by a corrupt group without a stable policy. In the North, the officials are to be retained.

It would be wrong to overlook the facts that the Conference proposals represent a passable attempt at compromise, and that they contain many improvements on the present Constitution. Radical changes should not be opposed just because they are radical, and it would have been too much to hope for a complete victory for those who wanted unification as well as democracy. Yet it seems a pity that the spirit of change was concentrated on separation rather than on securing a fundamental change in the electoral system. Over the greater part of the country, conservative elements will remain in control. The tendency even in the South is to identify independence with freedom. It is to be hoped that before 1956 it will be understood that the two are not synonymous, and that freedom is a positive, not a negative, concept.

<sup>1</sup> Minority Report on the Nigerian Constitution Conference.

<sup>2</sup> This, incidentally, removes the principal political argument for the separation of Lagos from the West. The other arguments are dealt with in an Action Group

statement *Lagos Belongs to the West*, in which the Lyttelton decision to separate Lagos is opposed and three alternatives (including the creation of a new federal capital near Kafanchan) are suggested.



## ORGANISATION IN THE GEZIRA

**Organisation in the Gezira Cotton Scheme is undergoing important changes. Some details are given below.<sup>1</sup>**

From 1925 to 1950 the Gezira Scheme was a partnership between the Sudan Government, two commercial companies and the Sudanese tenants.

The Government compulsorily rented for forty years the land needed for cultivation, and many of the landowners became tenants of the scheme. The Government also provided water and conducted some agricultural research in co-operation with the companies. In return, it received 40 per cent. of the profits from the cotton.

The companies provided capital, held the land on concession from the Government and let it out on yearly tenancies annually renewable, and cleared and levelled land for cultivation. They maintained agricultural supervision of the crop, provided staff, houses, offices and stores, and financed the transport, ginning and marketing of the cotton. In return they received 20 per cent. of the profits.

The tenants produced the cotton under a strict system of crop-rotation and conformity to an agricultural time-table. The annual renewal of tenancies was the final sanction in the hands of the companies. Within these limits, the tenants were responsible for the crop up to the point of delivery at the local collecting stations. In return they received 40 per cent. of the cotton profits. They paid no rent for land or water and they were permitted to grow food crops and maintain cattle for their own profit.

In 1950, when the companies' concession expired, the Scheme was nationalised. The Government paid nearly £3m. for the assets of the companies and set up a public corporation to continue the performance of the companies' duties. The Sudan Gezira Board thus became responsible for management and for capital investment. Its relations are complicated: as a Board it is appointed by and responsible to the Sudan Government through the responsible Minister, it must maintain a permanent channel of communication with its tenants, while in all its activities it impinges on the sphere of local government. The tenants and the Government continue to draw 40 per cent. shares of the profits (£E6,003,389 each for the year ended June 30, 1952), the Government, from its share, amortising its capital cost and meeting the

recurrent cost of providing land and water. The tenants' share is divided amongst individual tenants. From the Board's 20 per cent. it must pay Business Profits Tax, its own expenses and interest on capital, and it must build up its reserves.

### *The Tenants*

Before nationalisation, in 1946, a Tenants' Representative Body was established for consultation with the management in all matters, including marketing and tenancies, that concerned the tenants. This Body consisted of representatives elected by the 40 Blocks into which the Scheme was divided. Each Block was an agricultural administrative unit and contained 10 to 15 villages, each of which elected a representative to the Block. In 1952 the Representative Body became the Gezira Tenants Association with a formal constitution of its own. It covers nearly all the 28,000 tenants, and has been entrusted with the budgetary management of the Tenants' Welfare Fund. The Association has been continually consulted on marketing policy and last year distributed a detailed statement in Arabic of the account of every tenant held by the Board. It has also discussed with the Board the question of tenancies, which remain annually renewable under the new régime.

### *Local Government*

In its relations with local government, the Board has no single body with which to deal. The area in which it operates contains nearly half a million people living in 950 villages. Before the Gezira Scheme was established in the area, the people were largely nomads living under tribal organisation. The policy of the Sudan Government over a period of years was to initiate democratisation of native authorities in stages, beginning with the Sheikh-in-Council and proceeding to the establishment of Rural District Councils acting as local government bodies, each created by Provincial Governor's warrant when it was considered that the transition could be successfully achieved. In 1952 there were in the Gezira five elected Warranted Rural District Councils, 22 Warranted Village Councils authorised to carry out duties allocated by Rural District Councils, 294 Agricultural Village Councils which are preparing for recognition as subordinate bodies of the Rural District Councils when the first 22 Warranted Village Councils have proved themselves, and 17 Councils of Elders which so far are at the elementary stage.

The work of local government, however, necessarily overlaps with that of the Board, and always has done. From the beginning, the Scheme's inspectors exercised considerable influence in the villages, and

<sup>1</sup> For further details, readers should refer to the Annual Reports of the Sudan Gezira Board and to an article, *The Social and Administrative Effects of Large-scale Planned Agricultural Development* by C. W. Beer in the *Journal of African Administration*, Vol. V, No. 3, July, 1953.



'no problem of administration, whether it was a matter of finance, disposition of lands, market planning, taxation of animals and crops, roads and communications, appointment and dismissal of sheikhs, water supplies, education or public health services, could properly be resolved except in consultation with the concession companies' staff and with consideration of the general interests of the scheme.'<sup>1</sup> It became necessary to adjust the boundaries of the administrative units to conform with the Scheme's agricultural blocks, and the block councils, chosen by the village tenant representatives, were and are frequently consulted by local authorities on administrative problems. The Agricultural Village Councils, with power to impose penalties for such offences as misuse of irrigation water, were also linked with agricultural village overseers paid by the Government, who passed on advice and instructions from the Companies' overseers to the villages and acted as representatives of their villages in negotiations with the inspectors. These Village Councils, set up in 1939, naturally came to deal with all questions affecting the villages, and are now in process of working their way up the local government ladder.

### *The Gezira Local Committee*

These complicated relationships came under review in 1950. It was thought that a nationalised Board should take more responsibility for general advance than could have been shouldered by private companies responsible to shareholders. At the same time, the developments in local government which had by then taken place provided machinery through which the people of the area, including tenants, could shoulder more responsibility for themselves. In the first year of working, the salaries of the agricultural overseers in the villages were raised and were made the responsibility of the Board, not of the Government, as before. The nationalisation Ordinance also provided for the constitution of the Gezira Local Committee, whose duties include

'the submission to the Board of the advice of those living and working within the Scheme area and in areas adjacent thereto on all matters affecting the welfare of the inhabitants of such areas.'

This Committee consists of representatives of tenants, local government bodies, Government departments. It thus brings together the various bodies which have, in their different capacities, relations with the Gezira Board.

### *Social Development*

The Ordinance of 1950 also laid upon the Board the responsibility for contributions to social development. In each of the two years 1950-51 and 1951-52 the Board allocated, out of its £E3,000,591 share of the total profits, the statutory maximum of £250,000 to a Social Development Fund. Under the Ordinance, the Gezira Local Committee makes recommendations on the allocation of this fund, which is administered by a special department of the Board. From this Fund the Board has provided

money for the housing and transport of adult education officers appointed by the Ministry of Education, for the building and transport costs of the Barakat Training Farm for tenants' sons run by the Ministries of Education and Agriculture, for work on water supplies in conjunction with the Public Works Department, and for part of the work of a Co-operative Officer from the Department of Economics and Trade. Grants are also made to local authorities for public health work such as anti-bilharzia and anti-malarial measures. The Board's Report for 1951-52 notes that the purposes of the Fund are becoming more widely understood, and that local authorities are showing less inclination to regard it as a source of charity.

### *The Board's Employees*

Lastly, the Board must maintain relations with its own employees. The Gezira Board Trade Union was legally constituted in May, 1951, and despite becoming involved in the illegal general strike of April, 1952, 'has subsequently resisted outside interests,' and 'a fine spirit of co-operation between labour and management has prevailed.'

It is apparent from the above that great efforts have been and are being made to establish satisfactory social relationships in the Gezira area. Despite the imposing structure that has been created, there remain, however, some very important problems. Only one-third of the adult male population can be placed as tenants on the land, for example, while there is no sign that anyone has tackled the conditions of labour employed by the tenants themselves.

(*Editor's Note:* We give the above details for readers who are interested in the problems of nationalisation of plantations. Articles on *Nationalisation in the Cameroons* were published in March, April, June and July. The whole series may be obtained from the Bureau, price 8d. including postage.)

(Continued from page 10)

tration and assimilating to the Permanent Mandates Commission of the League of Nations—a body of experts which accomplished a great deal of good in the colonial field.

It is clear from Article 86 (2) of the Charter that it was the original intention that the Trusteeship Council should be a body of colonial experts, because each Member State represented on it is thereby required to 'designate one specially qualified person to represent it therein', but the majority of Member States represented on it has bedevilled the Trusteeship Council by designating to it representatives ignorant of colonial affairs who have resorted to abuse of the Colonial Powers instead of constructive criticisms. Of late there have been signs of improvements in the Special Committee, as well as in the Trusteeship Council, and if the policy was pursued of changing both of these into bodies of experts, both could and would fulfil a more useful function than they have up to the present.

C. W. W. Greenidge.

London, S.W.1.

<sup>1</sup> C. W. Beer.



# COLONIAL OPINION . . .

## Policy in Kenya

**The European Elected Members Organisation in Kenya has declared a nine-point policy:—**

(1) To build a strong and prosperous State which will be a bulwark of the Commonwealth in British Africa, maintaining British traditions of loyalty to the Crown, justice and freedom.

(2) To promote and maintain the Christian ethic.

(3) To develop opportunities for all loyal subjects, irrespective of race, to advance in accordance with character and ability.

(4) To maintain and encourage private enterprise unless it conflicts with the security of the State or threatens the proper development of its resources.

(5) To promote a sense of security for all races, and in particular to maintain the special rights of racial communities in those areas established for their respective use by treaty, ordinance, or Order-in-Council. Concurrently to develop areas of common opportunity.

(6) To safeguard the proper interests of each race from exploitation by any other, and to promote racial harmony and friendliness.

(7) To protect the direction of affairs in Kenya from the extremes of party political influence overseas.

(8) To ensure that the direction of affairs in Kenya shall pass progressively to those resident locally.

(9) To foster and develop friendly relations between our own and other territories of East and Central Africa with the ultimate object of federation.

**Mr. Michael Blundell, leader of the European Elected Members, in a speech to a delegate conference of the Electors' Union, said:—**

'The first principle is to create this territory a strong bulwark of the Commonwealth. . . First, the time has come for us to consider the creation of a permanent European guard of officers for the King's African Rifles. . . Secondly, we believe the time has come, especially in view of the very remarkable record of the 3rd King's African Rifles in Malaya, to support proposals for the creation of Governor's commissioned officers for Africans of exceptional ability in the K.A.R. . . Thirdly . . . we believe that proposals should be prepared for the formation of a sapper and miner unit, which could be drawn from the young Asian manhood of this country. . .

In the achievement of security for the Europeans we should press on as far as possible with the development of local government in the Highlands. In particular, consideration should be given for the whole orbit of land tenure in the Highlands to be transferred to the aegis of the county council. We also believe that the terms and conditions of entry and employment in the Highlands should rest with the people who have security in the Highlands. . .

One of the most vital factors before us is the consideration of those members of the Mau-Mau move-

ment who have taken the third oath or upwards; we believe that those men are beyond return to the ordinary confines of civilization. There are only two choices for those men; extermination and segregation. As extermination will be impossible we shall have to rely on rigid segregation. . . If there is any attempt to return men of that degree of evilness to this country as ordinary citizens, we will organise European opinion against it by every means at our command.

In African areas not actually troubled by the Mau-Mau movement, we should like to see a strong development of African local government. . . Secondly, we shall support, if the pilot schemes are successful, the development in all those areas from which loyal Africans have gone forth to deal with the Mau Mau, of rural technical training schemes to fit them to take a part in village life, in building their homes, and in tilling their fields. We shall support, to the ability of our financial capacity, proposals for loans to business men and farmers in African areas, in conjunction with their own local government bodies. It is our intention in the October session to introduce a motion calling upon Government to make an inquiry into the best method of creating for Africans, who have become caught up within the economic wheel of this country, and are now detribalized, some form of old age security. . .

Administration of the Kikuyu country for some time ahead will have to be of the closest and most meticulous, if the Kikuyu people are to be brought along again behind the ordinary processes of government. They must themselves take a most active part in their salvation, and we are going to urge Government to come out strongly with schemes of employment for Kikuyu, in which they will contribute either in cash or by work to the reconstruction of their own country. . .

We think the constitution must be built round our fifth, seventh, and eighth principles. The fifth is the principle of security for all. No constitution will survive which has not the confidence of everyone of whatever race, and which does not provide security for everyone of whatever race; nor do we think any constitution is any good that allows the policies of this country to be influenced and dictated to by extremist opinion from overseas. Lastly, we believe that any constitution must carry within it the right of the people of this country to participate directly in it. . . I speak for every elected member when I tell you that we are tired of a system of advising and recommending and urging Government to do things. We believe that that system has got to be replaced by a system of direct representation from the local people of this country. . .

My last word is that your elected members believe sincerely that we shall not solve the problems of this country until the responsibilities for solving them are placed on our shoulders.'

*East Africa and Rhodesia, September 3, 1935.*



## ***Trusteeship Column***

**Molly Mortimer continues her comments on Reports on Trust Territories submitted to the United Nations.**

### *The Cameroons under British Trusteeship (T/1042)*

The United Nations Visiting Mission to West Africa (1952) submitted its Report to the Trusteeship Council in March. The principal development since the Visiting Mission of 1949 was the inauguration of the Nigerian constitution in 1951. The Mission heard demands for greater regional autonomy in the Cameroons, which have now been dealt with at the London Conference on the Nigerian constitution in August. This demand took precedence over the demand for unification with the French Cameroons, on which the Mission commented: 'It was clear . . . that the practical implications of unification had not been thought out. The Mission noted that no political campaigns had been waged on the issue. It appeared that the question of unification was closely linked in the minds of the representatives with concern over their minority position in the Nigerian legislative organs and reflected their apprehensions that the interests of the Trust Territory might be subordinated to those of Nigeria.' The demand for unification was in any case confined to the South, where opinion is influenced both by the increasing stream of Nigerian immigrants and by the presence of nearly 14,000 immigrants from the French Cameroons living in the Victoria and Kumba Divisions. The fact that the latter have no political rights has led the French Cameroons Welfare Union in these two Divisions to ask for a status of Cameroonian nationality for the inhabitants of both Trust Territories to be recognised.

In general the Mission appeared satisfied with the political progress made in territorial and local government, and particularly with the evident freedom of expression. 'On several occasions it heard statements expressing public appreciation of these freedoms, for instance at a mass rally in Bamenda where a Cameroonian Member of the Legislature stated very firmly that one thing which the people of the Trust Territory enjoyed, and above all appreciated, was freedom of speech, assembly and thought.' The Mission 'draws the attention of the Council to this fact,' perhaps having in mind the statement of the Soviet delegate in the Trusteeship Council on July 16, 1952, that 'the political situation in the Trust Territory is marked by a total absence of rights for the indigenous population.'<sup>1</sup>

On the economic side, the Mission noted various problems relating to the Cameroons Development Corporation, including the need to draw up a scheme by which employees would be assured of housing on retirement. It drew the attention of the Administering Authority to a proposal that the Cameroons Development Fund established in 1951 should be administered by a statutory Cameroons Development

Board, and that all monies accruing from the Corporation profits, grants by the Administering Authority, and from the marketing boards, should be paid into this special fund. It found the Bakweri people still demanding the restitution to the tribe of lands leased to the Cameroons Development Corporation, noted that plots offered for resettlement in 1950 had still not been taken up by them, and that the Bakweri Land Committee 'did not wish to accept either the explanation given in the Trusteeship Council's Resolution 174 (vi), "that the ex-enemy lands have in fact returned to the people of the Trust Territory and that ownership is now legally vested in them," or the urgent invitations of the Trusteeship Council expressed in Resolutions 174 (vi), 382 (ix) and 616 (xi) "that the Bakweri should co-operate with the Administering Authority in its scheme for resettlement."' The Mission once again urged co-operation with the Administration.

### *Cameroons under French Trusteeship (T/1043)*

In the much larger territory of the French Cameroons, the Visiting Mission found the Administering Authority grappling with the problem of adapting tribal institutions. It noted differences of opinion on the rate of political advance: the advanced south regarded it as too slow, the more backward north found it too fast. Nevertheless there were some results: 11 traditional chiefs were taking part in the work of the Territorial Assembly—albeit not very effectively—by contrast with another who complained that servants and women had been given the right to vote.

The political structure differs fundamentally from that of the Cameroons under British administration. There are four representatives on the French National Assembly, three in the Council of the Republic and five in the Assembly of the French Union. Representations to the Mission indicated that some Cameroonians regard this representation as ineffective, and certainly it hardly seems a compensation for the right of the French Government to veto decisions of the Cameroons Territorial Assembly—a right which has been used once. The Territorial Assembly succeeded in March, 1952, to the Representative Assembly. The Mission noted a much greater participation in the elections than there was in 1947, but commented adversely on the short duration of its sessions (30 days) and on the dual electoral college system maintained 'in order to protect the interests of the Europeans residing in the territory.' The Mission preferred the single college system introduced for municipal elections in 1952, in which a number of seats were reserved for candidates who were French citizens. Within the Assembly 'the spirit of comradeship among the indigenous and French councillors was obvious from the fact that many of them used the intimate form of address when speaking to each other.' The Assembly has no legislative powers and may not discuss political questions.

Although the Mission received a number of com-

<sup>1</sup> Trusteeship Council Official Records, 11th Session, 446th meeting, page 7.



plaints about frontier restrictions, it had 'every reason to believe that the question of the unification of the two Camerons is not at present an acute problem. . . . It noted that the masses of the population were not interested in the question.'

#### *Procedure of Visiting Missions (T/1044)*

The Visiting Mission to West Africa added to its reports a general note on procedure for the consideration of any future Mission. Firstly it suggests that a greater flexibility in its programme should be allowed for, and a less crowded series of events be covered. Secondly, time should be set aside to deal with the flood of communications (some 4,235) which is received. Under the new rules of procedure the Visiting Mission has to decide which communications were intended for its own information, and which should be forwarded as petitions to the Trusteeship Council, and further, which, in consultation with the Administering Authority, could be investigated on the spot. While it was desirable that as much as possible should be dealt with on the spot, it was equally evident that a definite allocation of time must be set aside to deal with committees.

#### *Somaliland (T/1048).*

The 1953 Report of the Advisory Council in the Trust Territory of Somaliland under Italian Administration suggests that the Council and the Administering Authority are settling down to some sort of *modus vivendi*. The Council, now suffering less from internal disagreement, has become more sharply aware of its rights in relation to both Italy and the United Nations. While it is satisfied that the Italian Administration is now keeping it adequately informed of all developments in the territory in accordance with Article 8 of the Trust Agreement, it notes that requests for advice have decreased.

This may be partly due to the fact that the direction of policy is by now fairly well agreed upon, and that two liaison officers have been established. It may also be due to the fact that the Advisory Council has begun to proffer its advice on issues which have only been submitted for information purposes, as in the Plan for Education and the rather formidable control of private schools in the territory.

The list of items submitted for both information and advice varies from the trivial to the fundamental; from the question of insurance for lorries to the employment of minors. The Advisory Council has expressed a desire that the question of what issues should be submitted should be clarified, since present practice is confused and uncertain. This, however, would seem to be inevitable with a new and evolving relationship.

But the Advisory Council feel that if the matter had been clearer, its advice would have been sought before the Decree defining the Powers of the Administrator and the organs of the Trusteeship Administration had been made public. The decree, while not minimising the existence of the Trusteeship Agreement, makes only one mention of the

Advisory Council and firmly emphasises the responsibility of the Administrator for external and internal affairs in the territory. This is probably inevitable, but while the interests and powers of the Somali people are protected and developed, the Advisory Council is wise to be content with a watching brief rather than to confuse the issue by any attempt at dual administration.

## CORRESPONDENCE

### Informing U.N.O.

Sir,—May I be permitted to comment on a letter, published in *Venture* of September, 1953, above the initials J. B. and on Miss M. Mortimer's footnote thereon, as well as on her article entitled *Informing U.N.O.* in *Venture* of July, 1953.

Chapter XI of the Charter of the United Nations, dealing with non-self-governing territories other than Trust Territories, represents one of those incomplete compromises in international affairs which cannot but lead to argument and dissension until it is made more precise. The majority of the nations which took part at San Francisco in 1945 in drafting the Charter desired international accountability for the administration of non-self-governing territories, but the majority of the Colonial Powers resisted it and the result was Chapter XI, which places on Governments administering non-self-governing territories the obligation to furnish the United Nations with 'information of a technical nature relating to economic, social and educational conditions in the territories for which they are respectively responsible,' other than Trust Territories, 'for information purposes' as Miss Mortimer points out. The Colonial Powers argue that those words 'for information purposes' limit the United Nations to receiving the information and taking no further action on it, but the majority of Member States take the view that that would be a completely sterile object, and accordingly they voted in the General Assembly for establishing a Special Committee to examine that information and report on it to the Assembly.

In spite of the opposition of the Colonial Powers, that Committee has been set up and bids fair to be a permanent Committee of the U.N. Continued opposition by the Colonial Powers to its continuance would be interpreted by the greater part of the rest of the world as a desire to avoid international criticism of their administration and there is no doubt that such opposition would be most ill advised. The Special Committee has come to stay, and the wisest course would be to accept it and improve it. It has been used by some nations, represented on the Committee, as a forum of vicious attack on the Colonial Powers. This has stirred the wrath of the Colonial Powers and the United Kingdom has threatened to walk out of it. Instead of doing that, it would be more prudent to work for changing the composition of the Committee from its present national, political, character to a body composed of experts on colonial adminis-

(Continued on page 7)



# Guide to Books

## Co-operation in the Colonies

By Marjorie Nicholson. (Co-operative Union Ltd., Education Department. 1s.)

The practice of the principles of co-operation in British colonial territories is attracting more and more interest here in the United Kingdom. Among the rank and file of the Co-operative Parties and Guilds no subject commands closer attention than this, when it is properly presented.

Marjorie Nicholson has written, and the Co-operative Union Education Department has published, a pamphlet in the *Design for Study Series* which will stimulate and inform the discussion. It is readable and factual; it touches almost the whole of this fascinating field, and it gives glimpses of illuminating detail. It costs a shilling.

Co-operative enterprise in the Colonies has certainly taken root, and especially since Labour had responsibility at the Colonial Office. Between 1945 and 1950 registered societies and individual membership both doubled; paid-up share capital nearly trebled; the value of produce marketed increased five-fold and turnover in consumer societies increased eightfold.

There are many good reasons why colonial co-operation should be studied and its practice encouraged. Through co-operation many colonial producers are now getting a fairer return for what they grow. In many areas co-operative credit societies have helped eliminate usury; co-operative marketing has cut out the worst type of middlemen. Through co-operative organisation, with the provision of better equipment and technical instruction which it often makes possible, production has improved, thus meeting the most fundamental of the world's needs.

Above all, there is the fact that taking part in their own co-operatives is providing many people with essential exercise in good social habits and helping them learn administrative techniques. To people who want to go on to take a democratic part in governing their own community this exercise is invaluable.

Miss Nicholson discusses usefully the problem of how far Government assistance should go in developing a form of enterprise which (as British co-operators always emphasise) should be, by its nature, a voluntary one. There is no doubt that Government initiative and guidance is necessary, and equally no doubt that many British officers have rendered great service. Nor is there evidence that these officers are over reluctant to step back when enough local initiative is forthcoming. Not always are all people over-anxious to stand quite unaided on their own co-operative feet.

Miss Nicholson gives one example of how the members of Mauritian credit societies were exhorted to loan their own money at their own meetings without the direct supervision of an officer of the Co-operative department. In a forthright broadcast on Co-operation, Mr. V. H. K. Campbell asked why

members of the co-operative credit society should want a stranger present when they loan their own money. It could only be that they lacked the moral courage to do their duty properly, he said, and went on: 'The most influential man in the village, brother of the President and uncle of the Secretary, has applied for Rs.2,000. All other members know quite well he needs only Rs.500, . . . it is their duty . . . to refuse to lend more than Rs.500 . . . not an easy thing to do, for people who live in the same village. But no one pretends that Co-operation is easy. . . Co-operation consists in doing something for yourself, not in reaping advantages whilst the Government provides someone to take responsibility for all the difficult part.'

Which, of course, is the core of the problem.

There is another reason why Government guidance is needed, though admittedly a deviation from the pure principles of co-operation. Not all the colonial people capable of leadership and with administrative know-how are anxious to see co-operatives grow. Some have their own business interests to foster. A few of us might remind ourselves more frequently that a coloured skin does not necessarily mean that a man is an ardent socialist or co-operator.

Though the problems in the different territories vary greatly the need for education and finance run like a thread through all the co-operative effort. Much more can and must be done.

Miss Nicholson asks what more might be done by the British Movement. Much has already been done. British co-operative servants with a sense of mission have taken up appointments in the Colonies. Colonial students come each year to the Co-operative College at Loughborough. But the need and the opportunity both grow. More might be done by the temporary posting of United Kingdom foremen, stock-keepers or branch managers. There are recent indications of further effort to get even closer collaboration between the British Movement and the Colonial Office.

To have all these matters widely discussed can only do good, and publications like this by Miss Nicholson will help greatly.

This particular pamphlet is intended primarily to assist tutors and students in the Co-operative study groups, but I hope it will be read by all men and women interested in Colonial development.

Frank Beswick, M.P.

## SHORT NOTICES

**Native Administration in the British African Territories, Part V**, by Lord Hailey. (H.M. Stationery Office, 22s. 6d.) This volume covers Basutoland, Swaziland and Bechuanaland. It includes some general information and gives details on the establishment of the Protectorate which in the case of Swaziland is published for the first time. The bulk of the book is an exhaustive work of reference, but at the end of each section Lord Hailey includes a note



on recent developments in which he expresses his personal views on the future. These follow the orthodox lines of decentralisation of Native Administration functions to local councils, training through experience of local government, and progressive relaxation of external control. Lord Hailey is not convinced that the Basutoland medicine murders are directly traceable to the loss of status inflicted on sub-chiefs and headman by the reforms of 1938, which in any case did not become effective until the further reforms of 1945-46, and he thinks that the feeling in favour of liberalising indigenous political institutions will increase. Constitutional advance requires that 'attention must be concentrated in the first instance on the formation of a legislature.' Swaziland should have Chiefs' Councils with popular representation, and the first step to a Legislative Council should be the formation of a Native Advisory Council which can take part in joint sittings with the European Advisory Council. Bechuanaland already has such a Joint Council, but the African Advisory Council is restricted to Chiefs and their nominees and is still dominated by the ruling tribes. Lord Hailey considers that 'no proposals for the creation of a legislative body . . . should be entertained until definite progress has been made with the scheme for the creation of Local Councils.' This raises the problems of the 'allied tribes' and the position of the Chiefs, the latter being more likely to change as a result of internal developments than of direct Government action—'In recent years, nothing has done more to alter the attitude of tribesmen towards the institution of the Chieftdom than the long series of disputes between the members of the Khama family and the disturbance they have caused in the life of the tribe.'

**The Concept of Empire: Burke to Attlee, 1774-1947**, edited by George Bennett. (Adam and Charles Black. 18s.) Edited by the University Lecturer in Colonial History, Oxford, this volume is the fifth in the *British Political Tradition Series*. Extracts from the major documents, such as the Report of the Parliamentary Select Committee on Aborigines in 1837, are varied with more unusual items. Point is given, for example, to Curzon's famous farewell speech

('remember that the Almighty has placed your hand on the greatest of His ploughs') by the inclusion of Ramsay Macdonald's comment on imperial pro-consuls, 'They are the finest race in the world for keeping in old ruts. . . But they are also the least imaginative and sympathetic of men.' G. B. S. is represented not by *Fabianism and the Empire*, but by a speech from *The Man of Destiny*. There is a revealing extract from Rosebery's speech to the T.U.C. in 1884, and the final note is struck by Arthur Creech Jones in a Commons speech in 1947. A useful collection.

**The Colonial Territories, 1952-53.** Cmd. 8856 (H.M. Stationery Office, 5s.) The Secretary of State's report to Parliament. Essential reading for all who have and express opinions on Colonies.

**The United Kingdom Dependencies 1952-53** (Central Office of Information, No. R.F.P. 2612). A very short summary for those who jib at Cmd. 8856.

**Research and the United Kingdom Dependencies** (Central Office of Information, No. R.F.P. 2546). Gives detail of the financing, policy and organisation of research in and for colonial territories, together with accounts of work in progress.

## Weekend School

### COMMONWEALTH FUTURE

A week-end school on October 23-25 at Beatrice Webb House, Pasture Wood, Surrey. Director: Mrs. Eirene White, M.P. Speakers: Rt. Hon. James Griffiths, M.P., Rt. Hon. the Earl of Listowel, and Rt. Hon. Hilary Marquand, M.P. (Further details from the Fabian Society, 11, Dartmouth Street, S.W.1.)

## CONTENTS OF THIS NUMBER

For Reference October, 1953

### Comment—

Principles in Kenya - - - - -	1
What is Partnership? - - - - -	2
Informing UNO - - - - -	2
Oil and the Welfare State - - - - -	3
Trade Unions and MRA - - - - -	3

The Nigerian Decisions—I, by Marjorie Nicholson - 4

### Fact—

Organisation in the Gezira - - - - -	6
Colonial Opinion - - - - -	8
Trusteeship Column - - - - -	9
Correspondence - - - - -	10
Guide to Books - - - - -	11

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